While I was a gold star student in my freshman high school class, the fact this was the only year I've studied French means that my command of the language is somewhat rusty. Nevertheless, I feel confident that the title reflects the most accurate two word review (in English, at least) of Tom Conley's translation of The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Since you might be tempted to dismiss this act of linguistic hubris, allow me to show you abundant evidence of editorial and translatorial malpractice. You can download a scan of Conley's translation here. You can download a scan of the original French version here (or an excerpt of the first chapter here). Even my teenage French is sufficient to identify the problems when comparing these two. But for corroboration, we can also consult a fragmentary English translation prepared by Jonathan Strauss, as well as an unpublished translation by Daniel W. Smith.
Reading Deleuze is never easy. But in his solo work (ie. outside the collaborations with Felix Guattarri) the problem is usually not a linguistic one; the problem is not the overly complex grammar and vocabulary that often make French philosophy so infamous. Instead, the problem is that a relatively spare and dry style conceals a complex and exuberant philosophical content. Luckily, this is just what you pay us the big bucks for. Here at FPiPE we've been translating French Philosophical content into Plain English for over 6 years now! So let me begin with a brief overview of the philosophical content of the chapter, so that we can better see the confusions Conley's many errors are liable to introduce.
The basic idea is pretty simple. What distinguishes Leibniz's philosophy is an obsession with infinite folding. His view of things always seems to involve some sort of recursion -- any one thing is already double, and each of these aspects is in turn itself double, and so on ... ad infinitum. A fold of course already involves two sides. But each fold is always within another fold, and also contains other folds within it. In short, the fold is a fractal concept. It's clear that initially the two sides of the fold are matter and soul. On the one side we have extensive matter, and on the other we have the immaterial soul. These sides are distinct and never touch causally, yet they somehow communicate or resonate with one another. Each of them is, in its turn, itself also folded and refolded. Matter folds together inorganic and organic matter, interleaving these as butter and pastry in a croissant. And then each of these these types of matter is constituted by a distinct type of folding. Inorganic matter is characterized by a compressive and elastic folding that creates an infinite hierarchy of objects of varying solidity. The simplest metaphor for these inorganic material objects is the vortex, and for Leibniz, it is vortices all the way down -- matter is indefinitely divisible; we never reach a void or any homogeneous atomic units. Organic matter is also folded, though along a qualitative rather than quantitative axis. Each organism contains other organisms folded within it, which allows for a whole series a future organisms to unfold. Unlike the vortices of matter, which are all the same type of object at different scales, each level of organic fold is different. As a result, organic folding and unfolding appears to us in the form of evolution and devolution, developing or reducing the complexity of organic forms. And that -- aside from a somewhat subtle point about how souls, while distinct, are not simply 'above' matter but actually everywhere mixed into it like, say, raisins in pain aux raisins -- completes the basic outline of the first chapter.
Now let's examine how the combination of terrible editing and Conley's appalling translation makes this relatively simple scheme much harder to understand.
1) The first error I find is a relatively simple and comparatively harmless one. Conley has:
A "cryptographer"' is needed, someone who can al once account for nature and decipher the soul, who can peer into the crannies of matter and read into the folds of the soul. (pg. 3)
Deleuze in the original:
Il faut une « cryptographie » qui, à la fois, dénombre la nature et déchiffre l'âme, voit dans les replis de la matière et lit dans les plis de l'âme
I know from a past footnote that "qui" can be either "who" or "which". But in this case isn't it obvious that Deleuze is searching for a type of thinking and not a particular thinking person? Strauss and Smith both preserve the clear impersonal "cryptography" as opposed to gratuitously turning it into the personal "cryptographer". Like I say though, this minor ad lib on Conley's part doesn't create important philosophical confusion. To be honest, I only discovered it when I had already found so many much larger errors that I went looking for more.
2) I was first alerted to the possibility that Conley's translation had problems by the following passage:
The text also fashions a way of representing what Leibniz will always affirm a correspondence and even a communication between the two levels. between the two labyrinths, between the pleats of mailer and the folds in the soul. A fold between the two folds? And the same image, that of veins in marble, is applied to the two under different conditions. Sometimes the veins are the pleats of mailer that surround living beings held in the mass, such that the marble tile resembles a rippling lake that teems with fish. Sometimes the veins are innate ideas in the soul, like twisted figures or powerful statues caught in the block of marble. Matter is marbled, of two different styles. (pg. 4)
As you can see, Deleuze is discussing the first fold, between matter and soul. It seems the same image of a marbled tile could apply to either side of the fold. But then the final line becomes puzzling. Does it indicate that only matter is marbled, and that this matter is marbled "of two different styles"? Not only does this sentence sound clunky in English (what was wrong with "in two different ways or manners"?) but it introduces a real confusion the first few times you read it in context. I mean, what exactly are the two styles in which matter is marbled? And weren't we talking about the differences and similarities between matter and soul? Indeed, it turns out we were. Here is the original:
Il n'en forme pas moins une façon de représenter ce que Leibniz affirmera toujours, une correspondance et même une communication entre les deux étages, entre les deux labyrinthes, les replis de la matière et les plis dans l'âme. Un pli entre les deux plis? Et la même image, celle des veines de marbre, s'applique aux deux sous des conditions différentes : tantôt les veines sont les replis de matière qui entourent les vivants pris dans la masse, si bien que le carreau de marbre est comme un lac ondoyant plein de poissons. Tantôt les veines sont les idées innées dans l'âme, comme les figures pliées ou les statues en puissance prises dans le bloc de marbre. La matière est marbrée, l'âme est marbrée, de deux manières différentes.
Even I can see that Conley's final line is missing a crucial clause. The soul too is marbled, though in a different way, which makes perfect sense in the context. Perhaps we could chalk this up to an editorial mishap. But the same passage contains another pretty obvious error when it translates "en puissance" as "powerful". What exactly is a powerful statue caught in marble? What would make it powerful, and how would this convey the marbling of the soul? To restore some sense to the image we have to replace "powerful" with "potential" as Smith, Strauss and the first fucking google result for "en puissance french translation" all do. A potential statue caught in a block of marble clearly "marbles" it the simple sense of giving it some internal differentiation and figuration that might be analogous to innate ideas in the soul. It's quite lovely to think of our actual world as "marbled" by all the things we think it could be.
3) In the next paragraph, I found myself confused about exactly what error was being attributed to Descartes:
From this, however, we would not conclude, in the second place, that even the most refined matter is perfectly fluid and thus loses its texture (according to a thesis that Leibniz imputes to Descartes). Descartes's error probably concerns what is to be found in different areas. He believed that the real distinction between parts entailed separability. What specifically defines an absolute fluid is the absence of coherence or cohesion; that is, the separability of parts, which in fact applies only to a passive and abstract matter (pg. 5)
What does the bolded sentence even mean? What does the noun clause, "what is to be found in different areas" refer to?Descartes's error is certainly that he believed that,"a real distinction between parts entailed separability". So why is it only "probably" Descartes error? Is Deleuze expressing some doubt about what the error concerns, or about what is to be found, or even about which areas we're talking about? In fact, he's not saying anything like that.
On n'en concluera pourtant pas, en second lieu, que la matière même la plus subtile soit parfaitement fluide et perde ainsi sa texture, suivant une thèse que Leibniz prête à Descartes. C'est sans doute l'erreur de Descartes qu'on retrouvera dans des domaines différents, d'avoir cru que la distinction réelle entre parties entraînait la séparabilité : ce qui définit un fluide absolu, c'est précisément l'absence de cohérence ou de cohésion, c'est-à-dire la séparabilité des parties, qui ne convient en fait qu'à une matière abstraite et passive
For starters, even my teenage French alerts me to the fact that "sans doute" shouldn't be rendered as "probably". We can also see that there's no space in the original for what the error "concerns". In fact, as far as I can see there's no noun clause at all in the French, and "qu'on retrouvera dans des domaines différents" is an adjective clause which modifies Descartes' error of believing that real distinction entails separability. It seems Descrates made this same error repeatedly and in several different domains. Which is "probably" why both Smith and Strauss translate it exactly that way. Here is Smith's version:
No doubt Descartes' error, which appears in different domains, is to have believed that the real distinction between parts entails separability.
[UPDATE: I have been informed by more authoritative sources (Dr. M,
private correspondence) that "sans doute" can in fact be translated as
"probably". My high school French teacher is sans doute disappointed in me.]
4) Here are another couple small mistakes that create possible confusions, though both of these could conceivably be the editor's fault. Conley has:
Two consequences result that provide a sense of the affinity of matter with life and organisms. (pg. 6)
and:
But it becomes increasingly probable and natural when an infinity of indeterminate states is given (already folded over each other), each of which includes a cohesion at its level, somewhat like the improbability of forming a word by chance with separate letters, but with far more likelihood with syllables or inflections. (pg. 7)
The corresponding originals are:
Il en sort déjà deux conséquences qui font pressentir l'affinité de la matière avec la vie, avec l'organisme.
Which makes it crystal clear that life and the organism (singular) are being used as synonyms and not two separate things matter could have an affinity with.
and:
D'autre part, la formation de l'organisme resterait un mystère improbable ou un miracle si la matière se divisait même à l'infini en points indépendants, mais devient de plus en plus probable et naturelle quand on se donne une infinité d'états intermédiaires (déjà repliés) dont chacun comporte une cohésion, à son niveau, un peu comme il est improbable de former au hasard un mot avec des lettres séparées, mais beaucoup plus probable avec des syllabes ou des flexions
I was confused upon first reading that there were an infinity of indeterminate states, since it seemed like the point of this passage was to assert that inorganic matter already has a structure in itself that organic matter can build on. That is, inorganic matter is precisely determinate, and not just a random bunch of atoms and void. Of course, this pre-structuring of the inorganic is exactly intermediate between a (hypothetical) atomized matter and organic matter.
5) Then we find this howler:
If the world is infinitely cavernous, if worlds exist in the tiniest bodies, it is because everywhere there can be found "a spirit in matter," which attests not only to the infinite division of parts but also to progressivity in the gain and loss of movement all the while conservation of force is realized. (pg. 7)
I don't even think this is a coherent English sentence. "All the while conservation of force is realized," is a sentence in its own right, but here it isn't connected to the rest of the sentence by a comma or anything, so it appears as a kind of non-sequitur. Here is the original:
Si le monde est infiniment caverneux, s'il y a des mondes dans les moindres corps, c'est parce qu'il y a « partout du ressort dans la matière », qui ne témoigne pas seulement de la division infinie des parties, mais de la progressivité dans l'acquisition et la perte du mouvement, tout en réalisant la conservation de la force.
It seems to be saying that, because it is animated by a sort of "spirit", matter can divide into parts or gain/lose movement without violating a law of conservation of force. Accordingly, Smith translates this as:
If the world is infinitely cavernous, if there are worlds in the smallest bodies, it is because there is "a spring everywhere in matter," which testifies to not only the infinite division of parts but also progressivity in the acquisition and loss of movement, all the while retaining the conservation of force.
So perhaps Conley simply reversed "while" and "the" and omitted a comma. This still leaves a substantive different between their respective choices of "spirit" and "spring" as a translation of "ressort". Given that Deleuze has been talking about the "elastic" forces of matter the latter seems much better. Later, this "ressort", this springiness of matter, will serve as an indicator that even inorganic matter is marbled throughout with souls. But as always with Leibniz, it's important to differentiate between material and spiritual forces, since the two never actually have any causal interaction. Matter doesn't have a spirit, but its spring testifies to the irreducible presence of the spiritual.
6) The same paragraph contains another gratuitous omission.
Bref, pour autant que plier ne s'oppose pas à déplier, c'est tendre-détendre, contracter-dilater, comprimer-exploser (non pas condenser-raréfier, qui impliquerait le vide).
... becomes:
In short, to the extent that folding is not opposed to unfolding, such is also the case in the pairs tension-release and contraction-dilation (but not condensation-rarefaction, which would imply a void). (pg. 7)
While it's a small issue, why on earth would you choose to leave out "compress-explode" when it's right there?
7) Next comes a more confusing error from the very same page. Deleuze's completely clear statement that all matter is the same but that the forces acting on it are different ...
La matière organique n'est pourtant pas autre que l'inorganique (et la distinction d'une matière première et se- conde n'a rien à voir ici). Inorganique ou organique, c'est la même matière, mais ce ne sont pas les mêmes forces actives qui s'exercent sur elle.
... gets tangled up in questions of what other forces (presumably passive) are exerted on it:
Organic matter is not, however, different from inorganic matter (here, the distinction of a first and a second matter is irrelevant). Whether organic or in organic, matter is all one; but active forces are not the only ones exerted upon it. (pg. 7)
8) Finally, the rest of chapter 1 seems to be okay; we find only one more confusing and again completely own-goal type error on page 9. Conley tells us:
Thus the universe is neither a great living being, nor is it in itself an Animal: Leibniz rejects this hypothesis as much as he rejects that of a universal Spirit. (pg. 9)
This construction is puzzling because it seems to suggest that "a great living being" and "an Animal" are two distinct things that the universe might be, and that both of these are also distinct from a "universal Spirit". But the way you construct neither/nor in French turns to be identical to how you do it in Spanish -- ni X ni Y. And, you'll be neither surprised nor étonné to find that this construction is nowhere in the original.
Aussi l'univers n'est-il pas un grand vivant, il n'est pas l'Animal en soi : Leibniz refuse cette hypothèse, autant qu'il refuse celle d'un Esprit universel
It's obvious that "un gran vivant" and "l'Animal" are used as synonyms in a stylistic repetition here. At this point it seems Conley is ad libbing like a politician without a teleprompter. Is he translating here, or trying (unsuccessfully) to write the Quixote? How did he and the University of Minnesota Press get away with this? Why aren't there campus protests and picket lines, letters to Senators and outraged Facebook posts going viral? Has the whole world gone crazy!? Am I the only one who gives a shit about the rules!? Mark it zero!
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So there. I've satisfied my most nitpicking impulses. Luckily, something useful came of the pedantic desire to catalog these errors. In searching for a pdf of the French original, I came across a full manuscript of Smith's unpublished translation. I've already sent this off to be printed and bound, and then we can throw Conley's version into the fire.
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