The Passive Synthesis of Memory

Well, I have to admit that I'm not sure quite what to make of the second section of chapter 2 (pg. 79-85) quite yet.  It introduces a new complexity I hadn't expected, and is forcing me to rethink the last post about why the present passes.  But this is all part of the roller-coaster thrill ride of live blogging one of the great philosophical magna opera!

The overarching point of the section is pretty easy to understand.  In addition to the first passive synthesis of habit that we've been discussing, there's a second passive synthesis of memory.  Habit synthesizes a present from a repeated series of unrelated atomic instants.  Memory synthesizes a present from the repetition of the whole of the past via some new re-ordering of its levels (whatever that means).  Both types of present have to be synthesized before we can experience the active synthesis of what we usually call memory -- where a former present is represented to us as the past of a current present.  The difficult part is to understand just what Deleuze means by the second passive synthesis.  It's much more abstract than the first.  It's not clear to me how the two relate.  And then, just for good measure, he slips in this cliffhanger at the end of this section suggesting that we still need to talk about a third passive synthesis.  

Why is the exploration of the pure past erotic? Why is it that Eros holds both the secret of questions and answers, and the secret of an insistence in all our existence? Unless we have not yet found the last word, unless there is a third synthesis of time ... .

Given my confusion, I'll only be able to take a provisional stab at translating this section into Plain English.  We'll probably have to revisit it after we learn about the third passive synthesis and see how they are all related.  

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The first thing that Deleuze does in this section is to call into question my assertion that the present of the first synthesis, the present of habit, must pass because it is repeated.  Yes, the passing of the present is a necessary part of that present, but the cause of that passing is apparently not its need to be repeated.

Although it is originary, the first synthesis of time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes. Time does not escape the present, but the present does not stop moving by leaps and bounds which encroach upon one another. This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in the time constituted. We cannot avoid the necessary conclusion - that there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can occur. This refers us to a second synthesis. By insisting upon the finitude of contraction, we have shown the effect; we have by no means shown why the present passes, or what prevents it from being coextensive with time. 

It's as if the first synthesis is "nothing but present" -- past and future are dimensions of this present -- albeit a paradoxical present that inherently passes.  But in order to pass, these presents must be embedded in some temporal space that includes stuff other than the present.  To see the present as passing, you need a space that includes both the present and the not-present, that is, the past and memory.  

The claim of the present is precisely that it passes. However, it is what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be considered the ground of time. It is memory that grounds time. We have seen how memory, as a derived active synthesis, depended upon habit: in effect, everything depends upon a foundation. But this does not tell us what constitutes memory. At the moment when it grounds itself upon habit, memory must be grounded by another passive synthesis distinct from that of habit. The passive synthesis of habit in turn refers to this more profound passive synthesis of memory

In the last section, it seemed like the active synthesis was going to somehow accomplish this embedding all on its own, at least once the first passive synthesis brought the present into existence to begin with.   Now we see that a second passive synthesis will be required, one that constructs a general space of memory that allows for two particular points in the space to be drawn together.  The active synthesis of memory depends not just on the existence of two distinct presents (which the first passive synthesis of habit provides for) but on the possibility that these two presents can somehow be drawn together and related.  

Before really getting into the second passive synthesis of memory, Deleuze spends some time reviewing what the active synthesis was supposed to accomplish, and how the general and particular are distributed within it.   

At first sight, it is as if the past were trapped between two presents: the one which it has been and the one in relation to which it is past. The past is not the former present itself but the element in which we focus upon the latter. Particularity, therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in other words, to that which 'has been'; whereas the past itself, the 'was', is by nature general. The past in general is the element in which each former present is focused upon in particular and as a particular.

This may sound ridiculously abstract at first, but if we just spend some time improving the notation and thinking carefully about what's involved in our commonplace experience of remembering something, it quickly becomes more concrete.  Consider: "I remember locking the car".  What has to happen for me to have an experience like this?  Well, first, there has to be an "I" having a present experience.  That's what the first passive synthesis was all about.  Second, though, I have to be experiencing a current present that somehow includes a former present that I also experienced (as a present at that time).  That former present is a particular experience.  The current present is also a particular experience.  From the perspective of my current present, where do I go to look for the particular former present I'm trying to remember?  I have to look for it in the past in general, which contains a whole lot of stuff, some of which I would like to focus on and draw forth as related to my current present.  

... from the point of view of the reproduction involved in memory, it is the past (understood as the mediation of presents) which becomes general while the (present as well as former) present becomes particular. To the degree to which the past in general is the element in which each former present preserves itself and may be focused upon, the former present finds itself 'represented' in the present one.

[I have no idea why you would choose to call it the "present present" when "current present" is available and way clearer]

The past is the general store of stuff I go hunting in to find particular memories.  The idea is that without that general warehouse, there wouldn't be any place for memories to come from and to become related to the present as memories.  There would either be no memories at all and only present experiences, or every memory would literally transport us back to the lived present moment of the original experience, and right out of the current present we started from.  The phenomenon of memory seems to require some extra dimension of the present that defines an axis extending from "now" to "not-now".  

[

This, however, is not the same "extra dimension" we saw in the arrow the first passive synthesis gave to time.  Recall that habit synthesized time by contracting a past repetition into a present moment and generating an expectation that the repetition would extend into the future.  In that case, the past and future were really defined as dimensions of the present, and nothing went outside that present. What was particular and what was general in that first synthesis was the opposite of the way the former and current presents are particular and the past general in the second.

... what we earlier called the retention of habit was the state of successive instants contracted in a present present of a certain duration. These instants formed a particularity - in other words, an immediate past naturally belonging to the present present, while the present itself, which remains open to the future in the form of expectation, constitutes the general.

]

Clearly, this extra dimension is tied up with the ability of the current present to represent the former present as former.  It's the dimension required for the "re" in re-production and re-presentation.  An arrow goes from "then" to "now", which means that "now" somehow has to reflect itself as "now" in order for "then" to be "then" -- the two are relative.

Now the former present cannot be represented in the present one without the present one itself being represented in that representation. It is of the essence of representation not only to represent something but to represent its own representativity. The present and former presents are not, therefore, like two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself.

As a result, the active synthesis of memory may be regarded as the principle of representation under this double aspect: reproduction of the former present and reflection of the present present. 

 [Aha. Perhaps Deleuze uses the confusing notation of the "present present" to capture this idea of the present reflecting itself as present]

Let's pause and take stock of where we are.  The problem was: "How can there be such a thing as memory"?  So far we know that there has to be the construction of two different presents via a first passive synthesis, and that these then have to be actively synthesized in some extra dimension of another type of present that represents their difference.  The question now shifts to: "Where did this extra dimension of the present come from"? 

This active synthesis of memory is founded upon the passive synthesis of habit, since the latter constitutes the general possibility of any present. But the two syntheses are profoundly different: the asymmetry here follows from the constant augmentation of dimensions, their infinite proliferation. The passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a contraction of instants with respect to a present, but the active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the embedding of presents themselves. The whole problem is: with respect to what? It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself. Far from being derived from the present or from representation, the past is presupposed by every representation.  In this sense, the active synthesis of memory may well be founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be grounded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself.

The extra dimension we're looking for is the past in general, as in, there exists a past.  Somehow this past is just available to every present, as if it constantly surrounded the present with a swarm of possible markers that could be used to label it as some particular former (or current) present.  This is why Deleuze calls it another passive synthesis.  It has to be there in the background before the subject is able to actively recognize a past object and situate a memory with respect to the present.  Because of this sort of pre-existence of the past, Deleuze is actually going to reverse the question of the extra dimension and say that the particular current and former present are actually an extra dimension of the past, rather than vice versa.  In the first passive synthesis, everything was in the present -- the past and future were extra dimensions of the present.  Here in the second passive synthesis, everything is in the past -- the particular presents are extra dimensions of the past in general.  

This is where it starts to get confusing though.  How does the past in general actually exist?  It seems like a total abstraction.  And why are we calling it a "synthesis"?  What is being created if it pre-exists the present?  Also, why are we calling it "transcendental"?  I understand that term to mean beyond or before the subject-object distinction.  Sure, the synthesis that leads to us to conclude "there exists" a past happens before the subject gets to use it to represent a particular past to a particular present.  But I thought that's why we called it passive.  The first passive synthesis also seemed to pre-exist the subject.  Though I guess a subject is synthesized through it, or at the same time as it, whereas with the second synthesis there's no mention of a subject at all.  Still, as I said at the outset, I've grasped the problem, but not, as yet, the solution.